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The first purpose of this research is to study which are the main determinants of the 
changes of Brazilian corporate credit ratings provided by Standard & Poor’s. Panel 
regressions are applied in order to analyze the relations between ratings and seven 
determinants. Results show five statistically significant determinants.  
The second part of the study examines how Brazilian listed companies reacted to the 
recent sovereign downgrades issued by Standard & Poor, Moody’s and Fitch. Event 
study methodology is used. All the events deliver empirical evidences of negative 
abnormal returns, showing a strong negative correlation between the credit rating 
negative actions and the Brazilian stock market. When aggregating the events, 
downgrades to junk territory and Moody’s rating’s changes are the ones upsetting 
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Credit rating agencies play an important role in modern financial markets since they have 
privileged access to private information about security issuers thanks to their needed 
screening processes. According to Kang and Liu (2007), credit ratings have been 
historically embraced by financial markets because the levels and changes in ratings 
demonstrated to be a measure of the likelihood of defaults. 
   Companies in Brazil, and elsewhere, generally seek credit ratings to facilitate their 
issuance of bonds and commercial paper. Investors normally prefer rated securities to 
unrated securities and generally, the higher the rating, the larger is the second market of 
the related financial securities. Higher ratings securities are then easier to sell and 
exchange. In addition to that, some financial institutions are prohibited by their by-laws 
to invest in securities which ratings are below a certain level, especially in emerging 
markets. Changes in ratings can reflect variations of investor’s positions; they can 
strongly affect financial securities’ prices as well.  
   The Brazilian firms are mostly rated by the two leading rating agencies, Standard and 
Poor’s and Moody’s. Each of these agencies rate individual companies for both long-
term and short-term obligations (commercial paper). Standard and Poor’s further 
expands the rating classification in terms of local currency and foreign currency ratings. 
Credit ratings, in an emerging market as Brazil, are important not only because they 
help to assess risk in the Brazilian capital markets, but they also affect the ability of the 
Brazilian firms to borrow in overseas markets and in foreign currency.  
   According to Han, Shin, Reinhart, and Moore (2009), credit ratings, especially those 
issued by Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s, are critical to international investors who 
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wish to invest in corporate debt from emerging markets. Normally financial information 
in emerging markets is considerably less transparent than in advanced markets, this is 
due to a lack of reliable financial institutions that can certify the safety of an obligation 
to international investors. 
   Standard and Poor’s screening for each firm is both quantitative and qualitative, it 
attempts to capture the unique characteristics of each issuer. Factors that could affect 
the rating are the industry regulations, its competition and functional activities, 
management strategy, expected growth, risk profile, and the shareholders structure and 
vision. Identifying an pragmatic relationship between the qualitative factors and the 
ratings is complicated. However, Standard and Poor’s indicate that financial ratios play 
a key role in assigning ratings. According to Lopes and Walker (2012), the Brazilian 
market is characterized by low law enforcement, high manipulation of financial 
statements due to tax influences, an unstable financial market and modest governance 
standards. In this sense, it is not clear if credit ratings play a significant role in the 
Brazilian market.  
   Emerging markets in general have some specific characteristics that can lead to 
different results than those found in other more developed markets. Different 
regulations, governance standards and lower liquidity can lead to different results 
compared to mature markets. 
   This study initially tries to find out which are the main determinants of corporate 
credit ratings in Brazil. Starting from some hypothesis, it then studies the behavior of 
seven determinants in relation to the corporate credit ratings’ movements.  
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Due to the overall economic instability following the recent financial meltdown, 
sovereign downgrades outpaced upgrades in the last years. During the European debt 
crisis, almost every European sovereign debt suffered downgrades from the main rating 
agencies (Standard & Poor’s - Moody’s - Fitch). Similarly, during the recent 
commodities crisis, most of the emerging markets “commodity-dependent” sovereigns 
were downgraded. In the meantime Brazil suffered an economic and political 
breakdown that brought rating agencies to downgrade several times the national debt. 
   The second part of the research tries to understand how these recent sovereign 
Brazilian debt’s downgrades affected the stock market, studying the behavior of the 
stocks returns of the main Brazilian listed firms that are part of the Ibovespa index.  
   After studying the relation between quantitative determinants and ratings, it is of the 
study interest to understand how Brazilian companies reacted to negative changes of the 
national rating. The sovereign rating of a country is often seen as the maximum rating 
for the national companies; downgrades of the broad debt strongly affect companies’ 
ratings. The research tries to evaluate how these changes affected companies’ stock 






2. Literature Review 
Credit risk is related with the capacity of a lender to fulfill its obligations. The concept 
of credit risk can be seen as the probability of an issuer to default, that leads to non-
payment of interest and/or principal. Corporate Rating, in the Australian case, per Gray 
(2006), is “an independent valuation of a firm’s ability to make debt payments in time”. 
   Normally credit ratings are associated to letters. Table 1 shows Standard & Poor’s 
rating definitions for long-term issue credit ratings. 
 
Illustration source: Standard&Poors.com 
The credit agencies emphasize that ratings from AA to CCC may be modified by the 
addition of positive (+) and negative (-) signs to show a relative position within a 
certain rating category. Periodical outlooks (Negative – Positive – Stable), that indicates 
the likely direction of the ratings in the future, are issued. 
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   The researches regarding determinants of credit ratings start with Bouzouita and 
Young (1998) paper. They studied United States insurance companies that received a 
rating from the A.M. Best. They find out, as significant variables for the determination 
of credit ratings, profitability, growth in surplus, leverage, line mix, liquidity, size and 
organizational form.  
   Researches on this topic continue with Adams, Burton and Hardwick (2003) paper, 
they both study Insurance companies credit ratings determinants but for companies from 
United Kingdom.  As already mentioned Gray, Mirkovic and Ragunathan (2006) study 
determinants for Australian companies and, regarding Brazil, Sales (2006) do a first 
research on 44 Brazilian banks. Bone (2007) considers just Petrobras on his study. 
Damasceno, Artes and Minardi (2008) paper is focused on 39 firms that operate in 
Brazil. Finally, Bone and Ribeiro (2009) study 16 non-financial Brazilian firms and 
Murcia, Rover, Rover and Borba (2011) work on a sample of 49 non-financial Brazilian 
firms.  
   All the researches try to find significance of different determinants on credit ratings. 
Depending on the sample and type of company, different variables seem to be 
significant. Profitability and leverage seem to be the most relevant ones. 
   It is important to mention that credit ratings have been criticized in the last years; they 
played a significant role in American subprime crisis. Hundreds of billions of mortgages 
related securities and collateralized debt obligations were rated triple A, enabling them 
to be traded and to have a relevant secondary market. The write-downs and losses from 
these securities led to the collapse of the financial system. The same agencies were 
again hardly criticized, during the European sovereign crisis, for excessively fueling the 
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debt crisis issuing “political” and strict downgrades. According to literature the rating 
classification process lacks transparency, leading to the question of what are the 
relevant factors taken into consideration by the agencies.  
   Reactions of the markets following changes of sovereign ratings debt have been 
broadly studied as well. Sovereign downgrades directly affect corporate ratings (as the 
sovereign debt can be seen as a measure of the overall economy health) and the loss of 
the sovereign investment grade can mean that investors are forced to sell country’s 
bonds. Brooks, Faff, Hillier and Hillier (2003) found out that sovereign debt’s rating 
upgrades have little market impact, while downgrades are normally associated to an 
overall reduction in the market value. In case of downgrades, S&P and Fitch were found 
to be the most informative ones for the markets studied.  
   Almeda, Cunha, Ferreira and Restrepo (2012) show that debt impairments can have 
considerable effects on the respective stock markets and real economy activities through 
the sovereign credit rating channel. Following sovereign downgrades, firms reduce their 
investment and reliance of the credit market. This is consistent with the increase in 
firms’ cost of debt caused by the downgrades. Fatnassi, Ftiti and Hasnoui (2014) realize 
that sovereign credit signals normally have impact on financial markets. Reactions 
follow both own-country and closely related foreign countries. During the recent 
sovereign debt crisis, market of four European countries, Greece, Italy, Spain and 
Portugal, where affected by ratings’ negative announcements. Own-country market 
returns’ where initially affected and contaminated the neighbors’ markets shortly after. 
In addition, an interesting research by Shang and Saito (2005) shows that the Brazilian 
sovereign and corporates ratings directly affect spreads of bonds’ interest rates. 
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3. Hypothesis 
3.1 Determinants of ratings hypothesis 
For the first part of the research seven hypotheses are formulated. Each of these is 
associated to an hypothesis and has an expected relation with Brazilian corporate credit 
ratings. 
Hypothesis 1: More profitable firms have higher credit ratings. 
According to literature the proxy used for profitability is Net Profit / Equity.  
Auditing of profitability ratios enable financial analysts and regulators to assess a 
company ability to continue its growth and to invest in new projects. In addition to 
provide an indication of a company ability to respect its obligations, measures of 
profitability help to understand if the company it is successful in controlling expenses 
adequately. 
   Managers of profitable companies expect to obtain higher rating that helps to improve 
the corporate market profile. Moreover, in general, the higher the level of profitability, 
the better the company’s assigned credit rating. 
Hypothesis 2: Bigger companies have higher credit ratings. 
In many studies, company size is calculated as the Logarithm of the total assets, the 
paper will use the same proxy. 
Bouzouita and Young (1998) suggest that “company size is likely to be positively 
correlated with assigned credit ratings because larger entities have access to a relatively 
wide pool of investments and are likely to realize economies of scale in their 
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operations”. The research expects bigger companies to obtain higher ratings. 
Hypothesis 3: More leveraged companies have lower credit ratings. 
According to literature the used proxy for leverage is Total Liabilities / Total assets. 
Normally, as a company increases its level of debt, it becomes, from a credit 
perspective, riskier. Shiu and Chiang (2008) suggest that “a firm with high debt tends to 
have high financial uncertainty and consequent high risk of insolvency”. Its financial 
obligations are more likely to be found insolvent. The paper then expects an overall 
negative correlation between credit ratings and leverage. 
Hypothesis 4: Higher company growth means higher credit ratings. 
Company growth is approximated as the Change in annual revenues.  
A company with high growth it is expected to keep increasing its revenues over time. 
Adams et al. (2003) shows that higher growth rates are often associated with higher 
credit ratings because they indicate an expected important future cash flow 
performance. Companies with constant and high growth are showing the market their 
health, therefore they are more likely to be considered less risky than companies with 
non-constant, low or negative growth. 
Hypothesis 5: Companies with higher financial coverage have higher credit ratings. 
The approximation for financial coverage is EBIT / Interest expense. 
The financial coverage indicators attempt to understand how well a company can 
generate cash flow to pay its future interest expenses (Bone, 2007). As companies’ cash 
flows decline, the default risk directly increases, as there is a reduction of earnings that 
could cover interest rate expenses. Therefore, this paper expects financial coverage to 
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be positively correlated to credit ratings. 
Hypothesis 6: Higher long-term-debt-ratio means lower credit ratings. 
Per Roje (2005) long-term-ratio can be approximated as Long term debt / Total assets. 
A high level of long term debt obligations can higher the credit risk of the company, the 
firm can face difficulties to respect its obligations if future cash flows will not rise 
accordingly. In fact, the more the ratio is increasing, the more the company is going to 
be leveraged in the long term compared with the total assets, even more if the revenue 
growth is not growing at the same pace. This relationship should be particularly 
informative for an emerging market like Brazil, where long term is less predictable for 
the presence of inflation and political risks as well as other unsecure economic factors 
(i.e. BRL/USD exchange rate, China economic performance). 
Hypothesis 7: Liquidity has a positive relationship with credit ratings. 
Liquidity is approximated as Current Assets / Current Liabilities.  
Higher liquidity helps companies to meet unpredicted needs for cash, without fronting 
liquidation of assets (Bouzouita & Young (1998), p. 27). Higher liquidity means a firm 
has a better ability to cover liabilities with its current liquid assets, in fact either they are 






3.2 Brazilian sovereign downgrades hypothesis 
For the extent of the research,, this work will use event study methodology to study how 
Brazilian listed companies’ stock returns behaved around each downgrade. Strong 
evidences that each downgrades affected stock prices are expected. The reaction of 58 
listed Brazilian companies around 11 events are going to be studied, each representing a 
sovereign downgrade or a negative change in the outlook. Events’ days are reported in 
table 2. 
24.03.2014 S&P Downgrade two notch 
09.09.2014 Moody’s Negative change in the outlook 
09.04.2015 Fitch Negative change in the outlook 
28.07.2015 S&P Negative change in the outlook 
11.08.2015 Moody’s Downgrade one notch 
08.09.2015 S&P Downgrade to junk 
15.10.2015 Fitch Downgrade one notch 
09.12.2015 Moody’s Negative change in the outlook 
16.12.2015 Fitch Downgrade to junk 
17.02.2016 S&P Downgrade one notch 
24.02.2016 Moody’s  Downgrade to junk 
Table 2: Brazilian sovereign debt’s rating changes. 
On the 24th of March 2014 S&P downgrades Brazilian debt, denominated in both local 
and foreign currency, from BBB+ to BBB-, following large fiscal deficits, measly 
growth prospects and use of accounting tricks. Shortly after, Moody’s, on the 9th of 
September of the same year, changed the outlook from stable to negative, threatening to 
downgrade Brazilian debt soon if the economy would not end the slowdown and live in 
political instability. Fitch was the last agency to react to the Brazilian slowdown under 
the Rousseff government, changing the outlook from stable to negative on the 9th of 
April 2015.  
   On the 28th of June 2015, Brazil is threatened by S&P to see its credit rating cut to 
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junk; the agency changes its outlook on the sovereign debt from stable to negative. 
Soon after Moody’s downgrades Brazilian debt from Baa3 to Baa2, following weaker 
than expected economic performance, the related increase in government expenditures 
and in the overall debt.  
   On the 9th of September 2015, for the first time since 2008, S&P downgraded 
Brazilian debt to BB+, the highest junk rating. The faster-than-anticipated downgrade 
came after amplified political problems that have muddled economic policy. On the 15th 
of October, Fitch downgrades Brazil to BBB-. Shortly after Fitch is the second rating 
agency, on the 16th of December 2015, to downgrade the sovereign debt to the highest 
notch of junk, citing mostly political risks. This is the downgrade that the work expects 
to influence the most the market as many foreign investors and pension funds are 
required to sell bonds once two separate agencies rate them as speculative grade.  
   Few days before, on the 9th of December, Moody’s changed the outlook again from 
stable to negative, citing mostly political instability. The agency threatened to cut the 
debt to junk soon. That happened on the 24th of February 2016, when Moody’s rating  
was scratched to Ba2 from Baaa3. The event brought the sovereign Brazilian debt to 
speculative grade for all the three main credit agencies. The economic recession, the 
increasing fiscal deficits, the commodities crisis, the currency devaluation and the 
political situation, with the president Dilma Rousseff involved in an impeachment 
process, were the main drivers of the downgrades.  




Hypothesis: This paper expects to find a negative correlation between downgrades and 
negative changes in outlooks and the stocks returns of the main Brazilian listed 
companies. The most informative downgrade is expected to be Fitch one the 16th of 
December 2016, which brought the whole country into junk territory. The extent of the 
research groups the events together; S&P downgrades, since it is normally the first 
agency to act, and downgrades to junk, are the groupings expected to be more 

















4.1 Panel Data Regression 
In order to be able to run regressions with ratings as variables, several authors have 
converted ratings into numerical values. By doing so, we obtain an ordinal variable, 
which may be ordered.  
   This research will use two different conversion tables, inspired by different papers. 
These studies, Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, & LaFond, (2006); Damasceno, Artes, & 
Minardi, (2008); Silva, Santos, Torres, & Ferreira, (2009), have opted to split the 
ratings into seven groups. While Emawtee Bissoondoyal, Bheenick (2008) have opted 
to split the ratings into 21 groups. Table 3 and Table 4 show the different conversion 
ratings approach for Standard & Poor’s ratings. 
























































Testing the correlations is also important to be sure that multicollinearity can be 
excluded.  
   The following equation is used to run the panel data regression in order to estimate the 
coefficients of the independent variables: 
RATING = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1Leverage +  𝛽2Profitabilty +  𝛽3Size + 𝛽4Coverage +  𝛽5Growth + 
 𝛽6Liquidity +  𝛽7Longtermratio +  𝜀1 
 
The equation is used for two different dependent variables, derived from the two-
different ratings conversation tables. 
4.2 Event Study 
Event study is used for the second part of this project. Fama et al. (1969) introduced this 
methodology. Since then many studies have used this methodology to produce useful 
evidence on how stock prices respond to a set of information. Event study analyses 
differentiate between the returns that would have been expected if the analyzed event 
would not have taken place, normally the returns calculated on a previous-event 
window and the returns that were caused or not by the respective event, namely the 
abnormal returns. They can be summarized by the following equation:  
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇 =  𝑅𝑖,𝑇 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑖,𝑇|Ω𝐼,𝑇]           (1) 
The expected returns are then considered unconditional on the event but conditional on 
a separate information set. Different analytic techniques can be used; they differ with 
respect to the model used for predicting the normal returns before the event date.  
   For the objective of the research the focus is on one measure of aggregated abnormal 
returns. The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) that accumulates abnormal returns 
across the event window and is defined as: 
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𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑇1 ,𝑇2) =  ∑𝑡=𝑇1
𝑇2 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇                       (2) 
Due to the chance of downgrades prevention and anticipation by the market, this study 
estimates the estimation windows from 320 to 120 days before the announcement date, 
in order to exclude possible biased information in the pre-event window. 
   For the considerably high level of the risk-free rate in Brazil, it is preferred not to 
consider the market return model and the CAPM, since they assume a risk-free asset to 
compute a return premium. The market model is used. 
   The mentioned model is built upon the assumption of a constant and a linear relation 
between asset returns and the returns of a market index, such that: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑇 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑇 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑇                           (3) 
with 
              𝐸[𝜀𝑖,𝑇] = 0                                         (4) 
and 
      𝑉𝐴𝑅[𝜀𝑖,𝑇] = 𝜎𝜀,𝑖
2                                         (5) 
This model mainly differs from the market return model because the latter calculates 
abnormal returns by subtracting the returns of a market index and thus can be 
considered a restricted market model with alpha equal to zero and beta equal to one for 
each stock. 
   Furthermore, the market model parameters in the estimation window are estimated by 
ordinary least squares (OLS) method. 
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   The main test statistic in this paper is the t-test statistic. The t-test statistic for the null 
hypothesis is that the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) is equal to zero. The 
t-test for the time series is defined as follows: 
𝑇𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 =
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡
(𝑇2 − 𝑇1 + 1)
1
2𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡
                 (6) 
The statistics follows asymptotically normal distribution. The returns of the estimation 
window (that goes from 320 to 120 prior the event) are the basis for the variance 
estimator of the t-statistic, where M is the number of non-missing returns and d the 
degrees of freedom (e.g. market model d = 2), such that: 
σ̂AARt
2 =  
1
M−d













The post-event window abnormal returns are out-of-sample predictions and thus the 
standard error should be adjusted by the forecast error. The adjustment for the market 
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5. Data and Sample 
To study the independent variables’ hypothesis the research uses financial information 
of public Brazilian companies available on Wharton Database. 
   Regarding credit ratings, historical Standard & Poor’s long term local currency ratings 
are used, which are available on Bloomberg. Stock prices of Brazilian listed companies, 
as well as Ibovespa index, are from Bloomberg. 
   The first part of the research does not include financial companies for their differences 
in accounting standards and interpretation of various ratios. The period in consideration 
goes from 2007 to 2015. Due to the relatively young age of the fixed income market, in 
Brazil most of the companies were not rated before 2006-2007. Companies with no 
credit ratings or credit ratings issued by other agencies are not considered. Starting from 
a sample of 118 non-financial companies, to make observations reliable, the sample is 
reduced to 35 Brazilian companies for a total 280 number of observations. In the cases 
where more than one rating is assigned for a certain company during a year, only the 
last rating issued during the year is considered.  
   For the study on the sovereign downgrades effects on the stock market, the period 
took in consideration is between 2014 and 2016. Events are the recent Brazilian 
downgrades days of the major rating agencies, Standard & Poor, Moody’s and Fitch. 
The number of listed companies that are taken in consideration is 58, according to data 
available. Daily returns of listed Brazilian companies are constructed from Bloomberg 




6.1 Regressions Results 
As already mentioned, to find out the determinants of credit rating in Brazil, panel data 
regression is used. Credit ratings (RatingN) and (RatingN1) have been the dependent 
variables for the regression and seven independent variables have been implemented 
(Leverage, Profitability, Size, Coverage, Growth, Liquidity, Longtermratio). 
   Table 4 shows  descriptive analysis (minimum, maximum, mean, median and standard 
deviation) of the independent variables.  
Table 4: Descriptive analysis of the independent variables. 
 
 
I find out the frequency distributions for my two dependent variables. Table 5 and Table 
6 show the results. 
Table 5: Frequency distribution for ratings conversion split in 7 classes. 
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Table 6: Frequency distribution for rating conversion split in 22 classes. 
 
Table 7 shows the results of the correlation matrix, helpful to check for multicorrelation 
between the independent variables. Correlation between the variable are relatively low. 
Highest correlation registered is the 54,2% between Leverage and Longtermratio. I can 
then assume absence of multicorrelation and that results are not going to be biased by 
that. 
Table 7: Correlation matrix for the independent variables. 
 
Variables COVERAGE GROWTH LEVERAGE LIQUIDITY LONGTERMRATIO PROFITABILITY SIZE
COVERAGE 1 0,052 -0,212 -0,076 -0,277 0,099 0,132
GROWTH 1 0,06 -0,095 0,03 0,072 0,057
LEVERAGE 1 -0,288 0,542 -0,045 -0,288
LIQUIDITY 1 0,197 -0,033 0,24




Table 8 shows the results of the panel data regression for the first dependent variable, 
RatingN. 
Table 8: Panel data regression results for RatingN. 
 
 
Leverage, Profitability, Size, Coverage and Longtermratio are statistically significant 
variables, at 5% level of significance, to explain the dependent variable RatingN, which 
is generated from the first conversion table (7 groups). Growth and Liquidity are not 
statistically significant and they are not considered in the conclusions. In term of 
significance of the variables, same results appear for the second panel data regression, 
which results are shown in table 9, that has as dependent variable RatingN1, constructed 
from the second conversion table (22 groups). Growth and Liquidity are again not 







Table 9: Panel data regression for RatingN1. 
 
It is immediate to observe that the effects of variables on the dependent variables are the 
same. For RatingN1, Leverage is equally the only variable that delivers a negative 
coefficient.  
   For both the first and the second regression, Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 3 
and Hypothesis 5 are not going to be rejected as Profitability, Size and Coverage are 
positively related to credit ratings as expected. Leverage, therefore, in negatively related 
to my dependent variables. Only Hypothesis 6 should be rejected, in fact Longtermratio 
variable looks to determine in a positive way corporate credit ratings that goes against 
the negative hypothesized effect. This result could be related to different currencies 
used when issuing debt obligations and to a possible positive “rating bias” whenever 
Dollar denominated debt was issued, especially during the period when the Brazilian 
Real strongly appreciated against the US dollar.  
   Using different credit ratings conversions do not lead to different a result, which helps 




6.2 Event Study Results 
For the second purpose of the study, the next tables show event study results for the 11 
events on which the research focuses. The estimation window goes from 320 days prior 
the event to 120 days before it. These windows follow previous results with closer-to-
the-event windows that showed important movements of returns anticipating the events. 
It was then of the work interest to increase the size of the estimation windows. 
   It is also important to have results with different event windows, with 0 set as the 
event date, there are larger ones that go from -60 days to +30, from -60 to 0, from -30 to 
0, from 0 to +30, days before and after the events. Some shorter ones have been 
implemented as well (from -10 to +10, from -5 to +5, from -2 to +2 and from -1 to +1, 
days before and after the events). From cumulative abnormal returns results and graphs’ 
analysis it is possible to analyze if anticipations of the market happened. 
   After the individual study of each event the research continues grouping the events in 
three different ways. The first grouping separates all the events from the “junk” 
downgrades, the ones that brought the sovereign debt into junk territory. This approach 
continues in the second grouping, separating “normal” sovereign downgrades, “junk” 
downgrades and the negative changes in outlook. The last one strives to analyze each 
rating company individually, to attest how the market reacted to separately S&P, 





Table 10: 24/03/2014 S&P downgrades Brazil of two notches 
 
The results show strong evidence against the null hypothesis for all but two windows. 
Surprisingly the only window that delivers negative CAAR is the (-60; 0) window. The 
longest post-event window (0; 30) shows significant positive CAAR, as well as the 
shortest windows around the event. It seems that the market anticipated the downgrade. 
The event itself was not informative as the market already “priced” the sovereign 
downgrade in the previous weeks. Nevertheless, the negative CAAR suggests that the 
news and the possibility of a downgrade negatively affected the market.  By analyzing 
the figure, it is easier to assess the anticipation of the market, with the CAAR 
decreasing substantially approximately 40 days before the event.  
Table 11: 09/09/2014 Moody’s changes the outlook to negative 
 
Moody’s change of the outlook to negative seems to be less market anticipated than the 
first downgrade. (-2; 2), (-1; 1) and (-5; 5) windows all show negative statistically 
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significant CAARs. That suggests that Moody’s did not release as many information 
about its move as S&P previously did. 
Table 12: 09/04/2015 Fitch changes the outlook to negative 
 
Fitch was the last rating agency to react to Brazil poor macroeconomic results and 
recession. Its change in the outlook to negative did not affect the market. Results show 
statistically significant positive CAARs both before and after the event (-60; 0) (0; 30) 
deliver positive results, suggesting a positive trend that did not suffer changes after the 
announce. 
Table 13: 28/07/2015 S&P changes outlook to negative 
 
S&P change in the outlook was anticipated as the previous agency downgrade. The                  
(-30; 0) window shows important significant negative CAAR, that leads to assume that 
the move was expected before the actual official news. Nevertheless, around the event 
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date, CAAR shows high negative values. It can be assumed that the Brazilian 
environment was influenced by this change but it was also preparing for the future 
downgrades. 
Table 14: 11/08/2015 Moody’s downgrades one notch
 
Evidences from graph’s analysis and the (-30; 0) window, shows that Moody’s 
downgrade to Baa2 was slightly anticipated by the market. All the CAAR results show 
strong significant results and it is possible to observe a severe increase in the CAARs 
negative values in the windows around the downgrade. These results show an important 
negative reaction of the market following the event, even if a part of the shock was 
already absorbed in the previous to the event days.  
Table 15: 08/09/2015 S&P downgrades to junk 
 
As observed before, S&P downgrades tend to be largely anticipated by the Brazilian 
market. The statistically significant window (-2; 2) delivers positive CAAR results 
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equal to 0,0261. From the graph, it is possible to assume that the equity market 
anticipated the move approximately 20 days before the event as the CAAR drastically 
dropped. The (-30; 0) window shows negative significant results equal to -0,1339. 
Table 16: 15/10/2015 Fitch downgrades one notch 
 
Fitch downgrade to the last level of investment grade came after S&P downgrade to 
junk. The trend was negative around the period and it is difficult to assess if the 
downgrade was anticipated or not. The short-term windows (-2; 2) and (-1; 1) both 
deliver significant negative values, implying that the event negatively influenced the 
market in the short term. 
Table 17: 09/12/2015 Moody’s changes outlook to negative 
 
Moody’s change in the outlook gives a significant negative value for the (-2; 2) window 
of -0.0350. That imply a short-term market movement following the announcement, 
even if the (-1; 1) window delivers non-significant values. 
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Table 18: 16/12/2015 Fitch downgrades to junk 
 
Fitch downgrade on the 16th of December 2016 brought the whole Brazil debt into junk 
territory. Event study results are helpful to suggest that the market did not react in the 
period before the event. Both the shortest-term windows lack of statistical significance, 
while the (-10;10) and (0;30) windows deliver significant negative results. It is possible 
to assume that the market itself took some days to adjust and react to Fitch downgrade 
to junk. From a graph analysis, the CAAR looks to suffer an important drop 
approximately eight days after the event. Results show a late response to the event: the 
result could be also red as an anticipation of the following downgrades. 
Table 19: 17/02/2016 Moody’s downgrades to junk 
 
Moody’s was the last agency to downgrade the Brazilian sovereign debt to junk. Results 
show a clear anticipation of the downgrade, as it is also possible to observe in the 
figure. CAAR value for the (-60; 0) window is significantly negative, while results for 
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the (-2; 2) (-1; 1) (-10; 10) and (0; 30) windows all deliver positive significant results. 
These outputs help to confirm market anticipation and show an important recovery in 
the period that followed the event. Probably, as Brazil as the whole country was already 
in the junk territory, a downgrade from the third main credit agency did not worry the 
market for long. 
Table 20: 24/02/2016 S&P downgrades one notch 
 
S&P downgrades Brazil into deeper junk territory on the 24/02/2016. This downgrade 
came shortly after Moody’s one.  CAAR analysis ends to be similar to the previously 
mentioned downgraded. The work assumes that the market anticipated both the 
movements, as they came one week after each other. (-30; 0) window delivers positive 
significant value, implying that the anticipation was offset by a strong market recovery. 







Aggregate Samples 1; Downgrades to junk– All other events 
Table 21: Aggregated downgrades to junk 
 
When grouping the three downgrades that brought Brazilian sovereign debt into junk 
territory, it is possible to observe strong and significant CAAR results for the (-30; 0) 
and (-60; 0) windows. That shows some clear market anticipation of the relevant 
downgrades. The closer to the event windows are not significant, while the (-5; 5) and   
(-10; 10) windows deliver negative significant results.  It is possible to assume that the 
studied stocks were still negatively affected by the event downgrades, even after some 
strong anticipation. 
Table 22: Aggregated other events 
 
All the other events together deliver some interesting and contrasting results. The                
(-60; 0) window’s CAAR are significantly negative, showing again some anticipations. 
But the contrasting results come from the (-5; 5) and (-10; 10) windows, which deliver 
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positive and significant CAAR results. This unexpectedly shows how around these 
events Brazilian stocks were not overall negatively influenced and how they probably 
already priced the negative rating actions. 
Aggregate Samples 2; Downgrades –Downgrades to Junk –Changes in outlooks 
Table 23: Aggregated normal downgrades 
 
For the second grouping I firstly observe results for all the negative downgrades from 
the three main rating agencies. The (-60; 0) window delivers once again negative and 
significant results that could imply some market anticipation. (-5; 5) (-10; 10) and                  
(-30; 30) windows show, similar as in table 22, positive and significant CAAR results 
that is again surprising. These events were probably already priced into stocks prices 
and the events themselves were not significant for the overall market. 
Table 24: Aggregated changes in outlooks 
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Changes in outlook, when analyzed together, can help to draw interesting conclusions. 
The close to the events windows (5; 5), (-2; 2) and (-1; 1) all deliver statistically 
significant and strong evidences that stocks returns were negatively affected by these 
events. The windows that study prior to the event CAAR do not have statistically 
significant results. Compared to the previously discussed groupings, in this case there 
are fewer instances of market anticipations and the negative CAARs show clearly how 
Brazilian stocks were directly affected by the events themselves. The last window       
(0; 30) strengthen this finding, CAAR is large and significantly negative. 
Aggregate Samples 3; S&P - Moody’s - Fitch 
Table 25: Aggregated S&P ratings changes 
 
S&P events studies show strongly significant CAARs but contrasting results. From the 
above values, it is easy to deduce that all the S&P negative sovereign downgrades were 
strongly anticipated. CAARs of the prior to the event windows are negative and large 
while for the closer to the event windows results are strongly statistically significant and 





Table 26: Aggregated Moody’s ratings changes 
 
Moody’s event studies deliver some different results; in fact, market anticipation is less 
clear and significant. The (-30; 30) shows not significant results while all the closer to 
the events windows have significance and show negative values. It is possible to deduce 
that Moody’s shares less information about its future rating movements and stocks’ 
returns are more directly affected from the negative changes in ratings rather than from 
previous-to the events news. 
Table 27: Aggregated Fitch ratings changes 
 
Fitch events, when individually studied, are the less significant, and the aggregate 
results are difficult to analyze as well; the agency mostly reacted to the other main 
agencies ratings actions. An interesting result comes from the shortest window (-1; 1) 
that delivers negative significant values. The negative events themselves affected 
Brazilian stocks’ returns but not constantly and decisively as the other two credit rating 
agencies, S&P and Moody’s.  
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7. Conclusions 
This research first aims to identify the determinants of credit ratings in Brazil. Two 
panel data regression are built, with credit ratings as dependent variable and seven other 
independent variables: Leverage, Profitability, Size, Coverage, Long-term-ratio, 
Growth and Liquidity. The sample contained 280 credit ratings observations, issued by 
Standard & Poor’s, from 35 Brazilian public companies for the period from 2007 to 
2015. Empirical results show that, for both regressions, five variables are statistically 
significant at a 5% level: Leverage, Profitability, Size, Coverage and Long-term-ratio. 
Long-term-ratio variable shows a positive relation with the dependent variables, which 
goes against the negative hypothesized effect. Debt issued in foreign currencies, mainly 
US dollars, could help to explain this finding. Whenever the home currency is relatively 
strong compared to the issuing currency, long term obligations could be considered 
helpful and convenient for the future of the company. 
   For the second part of the study, the research strives to understand how the Brazilian 
stock market reacted to Sovereign downgrades. Event studies are used to help assess 
companies’ abnormal returns values before, around and after the events. The sample 
contained 58 companies that are part of the Brazilian Ibovespa index around the events 
period. Results suggest market anticipation for all but two events. CAAR results in the 
pre-event windows are often negative, significant and large. S&P downgrade to junk on 
the 8th of September 2016 is the most informative for the market as CAAR outputs 
deliver the highest negative values. The hypothesis of Fitch downgrade to junk to be the 
most informative is rejected, as the market was not that responsive previously or shortly 
after the event. All the events took in consideration deliver negative abnormal returns, 
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showing a strong negative correlation between the credit rating actions and the Brazilian 
stock market.  
   When aggregating the events in different groups, junks downgrades deliver the 
greatest negative CAAR and surprisingly, collectively, negative changes in outlooks 
seem more informative than simple negative downgrades. Market anticipation for the 
latter group is greater but negative values do not upset the ones of the former group. 
S&P movements result to be the most market anticipated ones while Moody’s negative 
ratings changes are the ones negatively affecting stock returns the most. Fitch 
downgrades do not affect returns as the other agencies actions do. 
   Overall, the research shows how the sovereign rating directly affects equities as well 
as bonds ratings. Financial ratios are crucial to define ratings but the overall country 
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Determinants of Corporate Ratings Research – 35 
Companies 
COPEL-CIA PARANAENSE ENERGIA 
GERDAU SA 
ULTRAPAR PARTICIPACOES SA 
DUKE ENERGY INTL GERACAO 
BRASKEM SA 
ELETROBRAS-CENTR ELETR BRAS 
CIA SANEAMENTO BASICO ESTADO 
BRF SA 
AMPLA ENERGIA E SERVICOS SA 
COMPANHIA SIDERURGICA NACION 
TELEMAR NORTE LESTE SA 
USINAS SIDERURGICAS DE MINAS 
FORJAS TAURUS SA 
CIA DISTRIBUIDORA DE GAS DO 
ELEKTRO ELECTRICIDADE SVC SA 
ALL AMERICA LATINA LOGISTICA 
ENERGISA MATO GROSSO 
CIA ENERGETICA CEARA COELCE 
CCR SA 
JEREISSATI PARTICIPACOES SA 
LOCALIZA RENT A CAR SA 
ENERGISA S.A. 
CPFL ENERGIA SA 





CEMAR CIA ENERGETICA 
TRACTEBEL ENERGIA SA 




PETROLEO BRASILEIRO SA- PETR 
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Sovereign Downgrades Research - Companies 
Vale SA Preference Shares 
Petroleo Brasileiro SA Petrobras Preference Shares 
Itau Unibanco Holding SA Preference Shares 
Banco Bradesco SA Preference Shares 
Banco do Brasil SA 
Itausa - Investimentos Itau SA Preference Shares 
Companhia Siderurgica Nacional 
Petroleo Brasileiro SA Petrobras 
BM&F Bovespa SA 
Usiminas Pfd-A N1 
Vale SA 
Gerdau SA Preference Shares 
Cielo SA 
Ambev SA 
Companhia Energetica Minas Gerais Preference Shares 
CCR SA 
Gafisa SA 
PDG Realty SA Empreend e Participacoes 
BR Malls Participacoes SA 
TIM Participacoes SA 
Hypermarcas SA 
Oi SA Preference Shares 
BRF SA 
MRV Engenharia e Participacoes SA 
JBS SA 
Cyrela Brazil Realty SA Emprdts e Prtpcs 
Banco Santander Brasil SA Unit 
Companhia de Saneamento Basico-Sabesp 
Natura Cosmeticos SA 
Suzano Papel e Celulose SA Preference Shares Class A 
Cia Hering 
Lojas Renner SA 
Telefonica Brasil SA Preference Shares 
Braskem SA Preference Shares Series A 
Companhia Brasileira de Distribuicao Preference Shares 
Cetip SA Mercados Organizados 
Klabin SA Preference Shares 
Fibria Celulose SA 
Lojas Americanas SA Preference Shares 
Banco Bradesco SA 
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Kroton Educacional SA 
Diagnosticos da America SA 
Gol Linhas Aereas Inteligentes SA 
Embraer SA 
Ultrapar Participacoes SA 
BR Properties SA 
Bradespar SA Preference Shares 
Centrais Eletricas Brasileiras SA Preference Shares Series B 
Anhanguera Educacional SA 
Localiza Rent a Car SA 
Cosan SA Industria e Comercio 
EDP - Energias do Brasil SA 
Eletropaulo Metropolitn Eltrcd Sao Paulo Preference Shares 
Centrais Eletricas Brasileiras SA 
Duratex SA 
Souza Cruz SA 
Metalurgica Gerdau S.A. Preference Shares 
Rossi Residencial SA 
CESP Pfd-B N1 
America Latina Logistica SA 
Light SA 
CPFL Energia S.A. 
Marfrig Global Foods SA 
Copel Pfd-B N1 
Prumo Logistica SA 
Brookfield Incorporacoes SA 
B2W Companhia Digital 
Oi SA 
MMX Mineracao e Metalicos SA 
Usinas Siderurgicas de Minas Grs SA Usms 
Vanguarda Agro SA 







AAR – CAAR Event studies graphs for outlook changes. 
 
 
 
 
